Hello, I strongly believe that the current mediation system is not good for the mapping scene as it currently favors the vetoing side through both a social, and mathematical edge, and by not offering the mapper any further recourse. In an inherently creative field such as mapping, this conservative stance toward subjective issues is not good as it inhibits the flow of new or unconventional ideas into the ranked section, thus providing a less varied experience for players. I will first explain the social edge that a vetoing BN has over a mapper who may be unknown or not have many connections in the community, and then I will explain how the current system is mathematically biased in favor of the vetoing BN.
The social edge that a vetoing BN may have is perhaps not as present if the mapper who’s map is being vetoed is a BN themselves or is a well known and connected mapper, however in the case of it being a relatively new mapper who does not have many ties to the community, the current system favors solidarity with your fellow BNs over standing up for the little guy.
The main issue here is that participation in the mediation is basically compulsory, and that the mediating BNs do not have any actual skin in the game. They do not need to put themselves at risk of backlash with their decision, as the BNs who nominated the map or the BN who vetoed the map did. This means that if they do not have particularly strong feelings toward the map or the veto, perhaps slightly agreeing with the vetoing BN but not believing that it is worth vetoing, it is easier for them to either vote agree or neutral to not upset their fellow BN rather than taking a stand and voting disagree.
While the extent of the advantage that these incentives offer may be debatable, there are no similar incentives that would skew the mediating BNs toward voting disagree at a general level, and the presence of this issue is one reason to make accommodations to protect the mapper and the variety of the ranked section.
The mathematical edge toward the vetoing BN is created by the fact that it takes 2 BNs to nominate a map, but only 1 vetoing BN to initiate a mediation. This removes 2 BNs who disagree with the veto (as they nominated the map) from the pool of possible mediators, but only 1 BN who agrees with the veto (because they vetoed it), thus skewing the probability that the majority of the randomly selected mediators votes to uphold the veto in comparison to the sentiment of the entire BNG.
You may ask whether this edge is really such a big deal, so I will elaborate on a hypothetical example of a randomly selected mediation where half of the total full BNs agree with the veto and half disagree.
For taiko, there are currently 23 full BNs, but I will adjust the number to 22 to make the 50/50 split easier to calculate, so there are 11 BNs who agree with the veto (including the vetoing BN), and 11 BNS who disagree with the veto (including the 2 nominating BNs). Since the nominating and vetoing BNs cannot participate in the mediation, this leaves 10 BNs who agree with the veto and 9 BNs who disagree with the veto as possible mediators, from which 7 people are randomly selected (The wiki says 5 for other game modes but for some reason they used 7 people in recent mediations). The probability that a random BN selected from the sample would agree with the veto in this scenario would be 52.63% (10/19) compared to the 50% (11/22) of the whole BNG that actually agree with the veto. However, this edge is even greater due to the fact that 7 people are selected. The calculations get a little bit complicated here so I will just tell you the numbers and leave references at the bottom of the post.
For the scenario in taiko that I just detailed, the probability of 4 or more BNs out of the 7 mediators to agree with the veto would be 57%, a probability 1.14x higher than the actual split of the whole BNG.
For standard we have 67 full BNs (I will simplify to 66 for the 50/50 scenario), so the probability of a majority of the 11 person mediators to uphold the veto would be 52.34%, not as big but still a significant edge as it is 1.05x the actual split of opinion.
In addition to a single mediation being skewed in favor of the vetoing BN, the way things are handled after the mediation concludes is also highly in favor of the side that would veto the map. If the veto is upheld, the mapper has basically no recourse, they are entirely at the mercy of the vetoing BN and the mediators, so if the actual BNG opinion on the issue is very split and the mapper has bad luck with which BNs are randomly assigned to the mediation, they have no recourse whatsoever beyond pleasing the vetoing and mediating BNs or letting the map grave.
However, if the vetoing BN has bad luck with the randomly assigned mediators and the veto is dismissed, they can still get one of their friends to veto the map again based on a similar but slightly different issue (maybe they can even omit an issue in their veto intentionally for this purpose) and they can try their luck again at getting a mediating jury more favorable toward upholding the veto. The rules don’t even state at the moment that the next vetoing BN must veto for a separate issue either, so the main solution to this problem would just be to solidify it in the rules regarding vetoes.
While vetoes may work well for very clear cut issues that a high majority of BNs agree on, the abovementioned issues make it quite unfair toward the mapper if the reason for the veto has a split opinion within the BNG, which calls for some sort of handicap to be given to the mapper to even the scales.
I also believe that the handicap should go beyond evening the scales and actually give a slight advantage to the mapper, since in a creative field such as mapping it makes more sense to be open and allow new or unconventional ideas, which will push the mapping scene further rather than being conservative.
My main suggestion would be requiring a 2/3 majority of BNs (excluding neutral votes) to agree with the veto in order to enforce it. For example in a scenario of a standard veto with 11 mediating BNs, 5 yes votes, 3 no votes and 3 neutral votes would result in the veto being dismissed (5/8 < 2/3), whereas 6 yes votes, 3 no votes and 2 neutral votes would result in the veto being upheld (6/9 >= 2/3).
This solution would allow vetoes to be upheld for clear cut scenarios where a strong majority of the BN agrees with the vetoing BN, ensuring that nothing overly outrageous will reach the ranked section, but would also allow contested issues to rule in favor of the mapper resulting in a ranked section that offers more variety for players.
Even if no favor is given to the mapper, the mathematical edge that I mentioned is an objective flaw in the system and needs fixing somehow to at least make the mediation fair.
Reference for the math part:
theory: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypergeometric_distribution
calculator: https://rgbstudios.org/replacement-calc/?N=63&m=32&n=11&k=6
The social edge that a vetoing BN may have is perhaps not as present if the mapper who’s map is being vetoed is a BN themselves or is a well known and connected mapper, however in the case of it being a relatively new mapper who does not have many ties to the community, the current system favors solidarity with your fellow BNs over standing up for the little guy.
The main issue here is that participation in the mediation is basically compulsory, and that the mediating BNs do not have any actual skin in the game. They do not need to put themselves at risk of backlash with their decision, as the BNs who nominated the map or the BN who vetoed the map did. This means that if they do not have particularly strong feelings toward the map or the veto, perhaps slightly agreeing with the vetoing BN but not believing that it is worth vetoing, it is easier for them to either vote agree or neutral to not upset their fellow BN rather than taking a stand and voting disagree.
While the extent of the advantage that these incentives offer may be debatable, there are no similar incentives that would skew the mediating BNs toward voting disagree at a general level, and the presence of this issue is one reason to make accommodations to protect the mapper and the variety of the ranked section.
The mathematical edge toward the vetoing BN is created by the fact that it takes 2 BNs to nominate a map, but only 1 vetoing BN to initiate a mediation. This removes 2 BNs who disagree with the veto (as they nominated the map) from the pool of possible mediators, but only 1 BN who agrees with the veto (because they vetoed it), thus skewing the probability that the majority of the randomly selected mediators votes to uphold the veto in comparison to the sentiment of the entire BNG.
You may ask whether this edge is really such a big deal, so I will elaborate on a hypothetical example of a randomly selected mediation where half of the total full BNs agree with the veto and half disagree.
For taiko, there are currently 23 full BNs, but I will adjust the number to 22 to make the 50/50 split easier to calculate, so there are 11 BNs who agree with the veto (including the vetoing BN), and 11 BNS who disagree with the veto (including the 2 nominating BNs). Since the nominating and vetoing BNs cannot participate in the mediation, this leaves 10 BNs who agree with the veto and 9 BNs who disagree with the veto as possible mediators, from which 7 people are randomly selected (The wiki says 5 for other game modes but for some reason they used 7 people in recent mediations). The probability that a random BN selected from the sample would agree with the veto in this scenario would be 52.63% (10/19) compared to the 50% (11/22) of the whole BNG that actually agree with the veto. However, this edge is even greater due to the fact that 7 people are selected. The calculations get a little bit complicated here so I will just tell you the numbers and leave references at the bottom of the post.
For the scenario in taiko that I just detailed, the probability of 4 or more BNs out of the 7 mediators to agree with the veto would be 57%, a probability 1.14x higher than the actual split of the whole BNG.
For standard we have 67 full BNs (I will simplify to 66 for the 50/50 scenario), so the probability of a majority of the 11 person mediators to uphold the veto would be 52.34%, not as big but still a significant edge as it is 1.05x the actual split of opinion.
In addition to a single mediation being skewed in favor of the vetoing BN, the way things are handled after the mediation concludes is also highly in favor of the side that would veto the map. If the veto is upheld, the mapper has basically no recourse, they are entirely at the mercy of the vetoing BN and the mediators, so if the actual BNG opinion on the issue is very split and the mapper has bad luck with which BNs are randomly assigned to the mediation, they have no recourse whatsoever beyond pleasing the vetoing and mediating BNs or letting the map grave.
However, if the vetoing BN has bad luck with the randomly assigned mediators and the veto is dismissed, they can still get one of their friends to veto the map again based on a similar but slightly different issue (maybe they can even omit an issue in their veto intentionally for this purpose) and they can try their luck again at getting a mediating jury more favorable toward upholding the veto. The rules don’t even state at the moment that the next vetoing BN must veto for a separate issue either, so the main solution to this problem would just be to solidify it in the rules regarding vetoes.
While vetoes may work well for very clear cut issues that a high majority of BNs agree on, the abovementioned issues make it quite unfair toward the mapper if the reason for the veto has a split opinion within the BNG, which calls for some sort of handicap to be given to the mapper to even the scales.
I also believe that the handicap should go beyond evening the scales and actually give a slight advantage to the mapper, since in a creative field such as mapping it makes more sense to be open and allow new or unconventional ideas, which will push the mapping scene further rather than being conservative.
My main suggestion would be requiring a 2/3 majority of BNs (excluding neutral votes) to agree with the veto in order to enforce it. For example in a scenario of a standard veto with 11 mediating BNs, 5 yes votes, 3 no votes and 3 neutral votes would result in the veto being dismissed (5/8 < 2/3), whereas 6 yes votes, 3 no votes and 2 neutral votes would result in the veto being upheld (6/9 >= 2/3).
This solution would allow vetoes to be upheld for clear cut scenarios where a strong majority of the BN agrees with the vetoing BN, ensuring that nothing overly outrageous will reach the ranked section, but would also allow contested issues to rule in favor of the mapper resulting in a ranked section that offers more variety for players.
Even if no favor is given to the mapper, the mathematical edge that I mentioned is an objective flaw in the system and needs fixing somehow to at least make the mediation fair.
Reference for the math part:
theory: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypergeometric_distribution
calculator: https://rgbstudios.org/replacement-calc/?N=63&m=32&n=11&k=6